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Action
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FROM: PARIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 14, FEBRUARY 6, 9 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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HSENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 14, REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 278,
LONDON 635, MOSCOW 163, BERLIN 73, GENEVA 91

RE MACMILLAN VISIT TO MOSCOW, SECRETARY SAID PRIME MINISTER
HAD NOT DISCUSSED WITH HIM IN ANY RESPECT WHAT HE WOULD
DO THERE OTHER THAN, AS ALREADY PUBLICLY STATED, TO ATTEMPT
RECONNAISSANCE BUT NOT CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS. COUVE
COMMENTED THAT MACMILLAN PROBABLY HAD NO PLAN WHICH HE WAS
GOING TO PROPOSE TO SOVIETS. SECRETARY SAID HE DOUBTED
WHETHER BRITISH HAD THOUGHT POSITION THROUGH BUT THAT
MACMILLAN VISIT WOULD MAKE BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION HAPPY.

COUVE RAISED POINT GERMAN PREOCCUPATION WITH INCLUSION
OF DISARMAMENT ON AGENDA OF POSSIBLE CONFERENCE WITH SOVIETS.
HE RECALLED THAT DECEMBER 31 NOTE HAD SAID MEETING SHOULD
DISCUSS GERMAN PROBLEMS. COUVE DOUBTED WISDOM INCLUSION
DISARMAMENT SINCE IF MEETING NOT LIMITED SPECIFICALLY TO
GERMAN QUESTION SOVIETS WOULD CONTEND THERE WAS NO REASON
WHY IT SHOULD BE FOUR POWER MEETING AND WOULD CERTAINLY
DEMAND PARITY. MOREOVER, DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT
MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO WEST WHICH NOT IN FULL AGREEMENT
RE GENEVA TEST SUSPENSION TALKS. SECRETARY NOTED THAT
CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF TALKS IN LONDON HAD BEEN DEVOTED
TO STATUS OF GENEVA CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR TESTS. HE
EXPLAINED US POSITION ON VETO ALONG LINES SECTO 9 FROM
LONDON.

SECRETARY REFERRED TO MESSAGE HE HAD HAD FROM ADENAUER,
DESCRIBING IT IN SAME GENERAL TERMS AS TO LLOYD (REPORTED
SECTO 4). SECRETARY ADDED THAT IF CERTAIN PROBLEMS
RE GERMANY HAD TO BE DISCUSSED IN CONTEXT OF DISARMAMENT,
CONFERENCE

PERMANENT

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
CONFERENCE ON SURPRISE ATTACK COULD BE RECONVENED TO PROVIDE THAT CONTEXT. HE AGREED THAT IF A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT, SERIOUS PROBLEMS RE COMPOSITION WOULD BE RAISED.

COUVE AGREED WITH SECRETARY'S ANALYSIS OF ADENAUER POSITION ON DISARMAMENT. HE SAID CHANCELLOR'S BELIEF THAT AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT WOULD LEAD TO WORLD DETENTE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF WHICH SOLUTION TO ALL OTHER PROBLEMS COULD BE FOUND WAS NOT REALISTIC. SECRETARY STATED THAT, IN HIS OPINION, WE COULD NOT MAKE MUCH HEADWAY IN DISARMAMENT FIELD UNTIL AT LEAST SOME POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAD BEEN SOLVED. AS LONG AS THESE REMAINED UNSOLVED, CONTINUANCE OF TENSIONS WOULD REQUIRE MAINTENANCE OF ARMAMENTS.

7. SECRETARY REFERRED TO DISCUSSION LONDON RE POSSIBILITY MEETING OF FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN PARIS MARCH 15-19 TO AGREE ON SUBSTANCE OF WESTERN POSITION FOR CONFERENCE WITH SOVIETS. SECRETARY NOTED DATES IN QUESTION ACCEPTABLE TO US. COUVE SAID SUCH MEETING COULD BE ENVISAGED, BUT FRANKLY QUESTION OF WHETHER THREE OR FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET CREATED DIFFICULTY FOR FRENCH. HE BELIEVED IT WAS GOOD TO STICK TO IDEA THAT BASIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR BERLIN WAS THAT OF THREE POWERS. SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS PROCEDURE COULD BE FOLLOWED AS DURING DECEMBER MEETING WITH TRIPARTITE MEETING PERHAPS ON MARCH 15 FOLLOWED BY QUADRIPARTITE MEETING FOLLOWING DAY. COUVE SAID HE BELIEVED THIS COULD BE WORKED OUT.

* IN RESPONSE TO QUERY BY SECRETARY AS TO WHETHER FRENCH HAD ANY THOUGHT ON SUBSTANCE OF WESTERN POSITION WHICH THEY WISHED TO DIVULGE, COUVE SAID FRENCH HAD NO PRECISE IDEAS AS YET. ARRIVING AT SUBSTANTIVE POSITION WOULD BE HARDEST TASK WESTERN POWERS FACED. SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT HE SUPPOSED WE SHOULD START WITH NOVEMBER, 1955 PROPOSALS. THESE HAD BEEN PRESENTED AS RATHER COMPLICATED PACKAGE, IN FACT SO COMPLICATED NOBODY HAD REALLY EVER UNDERSTOOD THEM. HOWEVER, THERE WAS MUCH GOOD IN THESE PROPOSALS WHICH NOW NEEDED TO BE POLISHED UP AND GIVEN A NEW LOOK. PERHAPS THEY COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED IN SOME RESPECTS

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RESPECTS. COUVE SAID THAT PRESUMABLY BOTH SIDES WOULD START FROM PREVIOUS POSITIONS, WITH SOVIETS INSISTING THAT REUNIFICATION WAS MATTER SOLELY FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN TWO GERMAN STATES AND FAVORING SOME SORT OF DISENGAGEMENT. IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER SIDE WOULD CHANGE MUCH. OBVIOUSLY, NO AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS WOULD BE ATTAINABLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF NO SUCH AGREEMENT ON GENERAL SOLUTION WERE POSSIBLE, COUVE CONTINUED, THEN WESTERN POWERS MUST FIND SOME SORT OF MODUS VIVENDI. IF REUNIFICATION IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AT PRESENT TIME, THEN SOLUTION MUST BE SOUGHT WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO GET THROUGH NEXT FEW YEARS.

SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT THINK WE WERE GOING TO BRING ABOUT REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY AT CONFERENCE. HE WAS NOT SURE, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE TALK ON SUBJECT, THAT THERE WAS MUCH REAL EAGERNESS FOR REUNIFICATION. EVEN IN GERMANY THERE WERE FACTORS SUCH AS POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASED SOCIALIST STRENGTH WHICH REDUCED ENTHUSIASM. SECRETARY AND COUVE ENDED WITH AGREEMENT ON NOTE THAT FEDREP SHOULD BE LESS FEARFUL OF ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PERMIT EXERCISE OF ITS INFLUENCE OVER EAST GERMANY, AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR INFERIORITY COMPLEX VIS-A-VIS GDR.

DISCUSSION RE SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED TOSEC 15 BEING REPORTED SEPARATE CABLE.

AMBASSADOR WHITNEY AUTHORIZED IN HIS DISCRETION TO CONVEY APPROPRIATE PORTIONS OF FOREGOING TO LLOYD.

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